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TRAPPED TO CONFESS: STATE v. GRAY AND 
ARIZONA’S OUTLIER ENTRAPMENT 
STATUTE 
VENUS CHUI* 
Abstract: On June 20, 2016, in State v. Gray, the Arizona Supreme Court held 
that for a defendant to invoke the defense of entrapment, he or she must affirma-
tively admit each element of the crime. The case emerged after Maverick Gray 
was arrested and charged for selling cocaine to an undercover police officer, and 
raised the entrapment defense at trial without disputing the government’s evi-
dence of his guilt. The court explained that simply choosing not to challenge the 
evidence does not rise to the level of an affirmative admission. The dissent per-
suasively argued that Arizona’s entrapment statute is draconian by contradicting a 
defendant’s right against self-incrimination, protected by the Fifth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution. This Comment agrees with the dissent’s position that Ari-
zona’s entrapment defense should be read narrowly to uphold fairness and to pro-
tect defendants’ constitutional liberties. 
INTRODUCTION 
In June 2013, an undercover Tucson, Arizona, police officer approached 
Maverick Gray at a bus stop to buy crack cocaine, which Gray agreed to sell 
for ten dollars.1 Gray was subsequently arrested and charged with sale of nar-
cotics.2 At trial, Gray requested a jury instruction on the entrapment defense 
recognized in Arizona’s criminal code, section 13-206 of the Arizona Revised 
Statute.3 The Pima County Superior Court denied Gray the ability to assert the 
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 1 State v. Gray (Gray II ) , 372 P.3d 999, 1000–01 (Ariz. 2016); State v. Gray (Gray I), 357 P.3d 
831, 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015), vacated, 372 P.3d 999. 
 2 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832–33. 
 3 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 833; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206(A)–
(B) (2017); see also State v. Gessler, 690 P.2d 98, 101 (Ariz. 1984) (“Entrapment is a question for the 
jury unless there is no evidence to support the defense or unless uncontradicted testimony makes it 
clear that an otherwise innocent person has been induced to commit criminal acts.”). When a defend-
ant raises a legitimate defense supported by evidence, the judge must instruct the jury on the law de-
fining the defense. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS ch. 8, § 8.01 (COMM. ON MODEL CIVIL JURY IN-
STRUCTIONS WITHIN THE THIRD CIRCUIT 2016). The Arizona entrapment statute requires a person 
raising the affirmative defense of entrapment to admit by the person’s testimony or other evidence the 
elements of the crime, and to prove by clear and convincing evidence that (1) the idea of committing 
the offense originated with law enforcement officers or their agents; (2) the law enforcement officers 
and their agents urged and induced the person to commit the offense; and (3) the person was not pre-
disposed to commit the offense before being urged or induced. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206(B). 
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defense and declined to instruct the jury on it, reasoning that Gray did not meet 
the requirements of the entrapment statute.4 The court concluded that Gray did 
not meet the statute’s requirement to “admit by [his] testimony or other evi-
dence the substantial elements of the offense charged” when he simply chose 
not to challenge the State’s evidence.5 
The Arizona Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision, and the 
Arizona Supreme Court granted review.6 In the majority opinion, written by 
Chief Justice Scott Bales, the Arizona Supreme Court acknowledged that the 
entrapment statute is not clear on whether a defendant can admit the elements 
of an offense by remaining silent.7 However, the court ultimately affirmed the 
trial court’s decision.8 The court based its decision primarily on the ground that 
Arizona’s current entrapment defense is a product of pre-1997 Arizona com-
mon law, which embodied the view that defendants must affirmatively admit 
the substantial elements of the crime in order to assert the entrapment defense.9 
As Justice Clint Bolick indicated in his dissent, however, this is the minority 
approach when compared with other states’ modern entrapment statutes.10 
Justice Bolick’s dissent specifically argued that requiring affirmative ad-
mission from defendants in order to invoke the entrapment defense may conflict 
with the U.S. Constitution’s Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause.11 It 
may present an unconstitutional condition on defendants that forces them to 
give up a constitutional right in order to raise the defense.12 Justice Bolick 
                                                                                                                           
 4 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001. 
 5 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1000–01 (alteration in original) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§ 13-206(A)); Gray I, 357 P.3d at 833. 
 6 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 834. 
 7 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1000–01 (“The [Arizona entrapment] statute does not expressly address 
whether a defendant can ‘admit’ the elements merely by not challenging the state’s evidence.”). 
 8 Id. at 1004. 
 9 Id. at 1001–02 (citing State v. McKinney, 501 P.2d 378, 381 (Ariz. 1972) (holding that a de-
fendant must admit the substantial elements of the crime in order to invoke the entrapment defense); 
and then citing State v. Nilsen, 657 P.2d 419, 420 (Ariz. 1983) (clarifying that a defendant need not 
take the stand in order to assert the entrapment defense, but also cannot merely passively admit the 
elements of the crime)). 
 10 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1004–06 (Bolick, J., dissenting) (noting that many courts, including the 
U.S. Supreme Court, agree that failure to admit all the elements of a crime does not necessarily result 
in inconsistency with the entrapment defense, and that inconsistency is arguably not even at issue 
because it is possible for a defense to be logically raised even if a defendant does not admit to every 
element of the crime). 
 11 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. V) (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to 
be a witness against himself . . . .”). The Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination Clause ensures that 
any confession made by a defendant in a criminal case is made freely and voluntarily, without com-
pulsion or improper influence. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542–43, 546 (1897). 
 12 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1006–09 (“Here, Arizona offers an entrapment defense to criminal defend-
ants, but only at the cost of surrendering the right against self-incrimination. The State is not constitu-
tionally entitled to exact such a high cost for invoking a legitimate (indeed in many instances essen-
tial) defense.”). 
34 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
found this especially problematic in light of the fact that the Arizona Supreme 
Court’s only justification for the condition is that innocence and entrapment 
are inconsistent defenses, which might confuse the jury.13 He argued that even 
under the majority’s method of construing the entrapment statute, the incrimi-
nating statements that Gray made to the undercover police officer nevertheless 
constituted “other evidence” from which the court could conclude that Gray 
admitted to the offense.14 
Part I of this comment summarizes the factual and procedural history of 
Gray. Part II analyzes the majority’s reasoning behind upholding a strict read-
ing of Arizona’s entrapment statute and requiring affirmative admission from 
defendants. Part III advocates for the dissent’s view that Arizona’s entrapment 
statute threatens defendants’ constitutional right against self-incrimination and 
fails to consider the possibility that denial of certain elements of a crime could 
still be consistent with the defense of entrapment. 
I. A COMMON LAW-DRIVEN DECISION 
In June 2013, an undercover police officer approached Maverick Gray at 
a bus stop in Pima County, Arizona, and asked if Gray could help him obtain 
“hard,” also known as crack cocaine.15 Gray made a deal with the officer to get 
him cocaine for a ten-dollar fee, and the two of them drove to an apartment 
complex.16 The undercover officer paid Gray twenty dollars and Gray left the 
car, returning after ten minutes with the requested drugs.17 Shortly after the 
officer paid the fee, Gray was arrested and charged with sale of narcotics.18 
Throughout the transaction and arrest, the undercover officer had also been 
secretly recording his conversation with Gray.19 The conversation included 
statements from Gray after the arrest, such as, “I’m a good person” and “I 
don’t usually do this.”20 
Gray’s criminal case was brought to the Pima County Superior Court.21 
The government introduced into evidence the statements recorded by the un-
                                                                                                                           
 13 Id. at 1007 (“Given the centrality of the right against self-incrimination in both the Bill of 
Rights and our state’s Declaration of Rights, it would be difficult for the State to articulate a sufficient 
justification for the condition. Instead, the State’s justifications are feeble . . . .”) (citation omitted). 
 14 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206(A) (2017) (“To claim entrapment, the person must admit by 
the person’s testimony or other evidence the substantial elements of the offense charged.”) (emphasis 
added); Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1009–10. 
 15 State v. Gray (Gray II ) , 372 P.3d 999, 1000–01 (Ariz. 2016); State v. Gray (Gray I), 357 P.3d 
831, 832 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2015), vacated, 372 P.3d 999. 
 16 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832. 
 17 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832. 
 18 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832. 
 19 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832–33, 834. 
 20 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001. 
 21 Id. at 1000. 
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dercover officer over Gray’s objection.22 Gray did not contest the State’s evi-
dence, but raised the defense of entrapment, codified in section 13-206.23 
Arizona’s entrapment defense is an affirmative defense based on the theo-
ry that a defendant only committed the offense because law enforcement 
prompted and urged him or her to do so, and that he or she did not have a pre-
disposition to commit the crime.24 The entrapment defense requires a defend-
ant to first “admit by [his] testimony or other evidence the substantial elements 
of the offense charged.”25 Gray argued to the trial court that he had admitted to 
the elements of the crime, either by not challenging the government’s evidence 
or through his recorded incriminating statements.26 The trial court rejected 
Gray’s arguments, concluding that he failed to meet the admission requirement 
of the entrapment statute, and denied Gray’s request for a jury instruction on 
the entrapment defense.27 The trial court found Gray guilty of the sale of nar-
cotics, and sentenced him to nine years and three months in prison.28 
Gray then appealed his conviction to the Arizona Court of Appeals.29 On 
August 13, 2015, in an opinion written by Justice Michael O. Miller, the court 
of appeals held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to 
give a jury instruction on the entrapment defense, and thus affirmed the trial 
court’s decision.30 The court of appeals reasoned that Gray could not assert the 
entrapment defense because Gray did not make any statements at trial, either 
through testimony or a stipulation read into evidence, that could be considered 
an admission of the substantial elements of the crime.31 The court of appeals 
also found that Gray’s recorded statements did not satisfy section 13-206 be-
                                                                                                                           
 22 Id. at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832–33. 
 23 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206 (2017); Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 833. 
 24 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206(A)–(B). Subsection B of Arizona’s entrapment statute reads: 
A person who asserts an entrapment defense has the burden of proving the following by 
clear and convincing evidence: 
1. The idea of committing the offense started with law enforcement officers or their 
agents rather than with the person. 
2. The law enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the person to commit 
the offense. 
3. The person was not predisposed to commit the type of offense charged before the law 
enforcement officers or their agents urged and induced the person to commit the of-
fense. 
Id. § 13-206(B). 
 25 ID. § 13-206(A). 
 26 Gray I, 357 P.3d at 833. 
 27 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 833. 
 28 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832, 833. 
 29 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 832, 833. 
 30 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 831, 834. 
 31 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001; Gray I, 357 P.3d at 833. 
36 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
cause the admission had to be affirmatively admitted, not implicitly admitted 
by existing evidence.32 
Gray appealed and the Arizona Supreme Court granted de novo review of 
the case, finding that application of the entrapment statute was an important 
state-wide issue.33 The court, in an opinion written by Chief Justice Scott 
Bales, affirmed the decision of the trial court and vacated the judgment of the 
court of appeals.34 The court began its analysis of whether Gray could appro-
priately invoke the entrapment defense by examining the Arizona entrapment 
statute itself.35 The court acknowledged that the statute does not clarify wheth-
er a defendant can admit the elements of a crime simply by remaining silent.36 
Gray argued that silence should be deemed an admission, but the court ulti-
mately rejected this view, interpreting the statute based on the case law influ-
encing the statute’s enactment.37 The court alluded to two previous Arizona 
Supreme Court cases illustrating this common law approach to the entrapment 
defense: State v. McKinney, decided in 1972, and State v. Nilsen, decided in 
1983.38 In both cases, the court held that a defendant asserting an entrapment 
defense must admit the substantial elements of the crime.39 Nilsen further clari-
fied that this assertion cannot be made through silence, but must be in the form 
of in-court testimony or an alternative such as a stipulation read into evi-
dence.40 Thus, based on the pre-1997 case law supporting the affirmative ad-
mission requirement for asserting the entrapment defense, the court in Gray 
held that Gray was not eligible to invoke the defense.41 
Furthermore, the court rejected Gray’s argument that requiring a defend-
ant to affirmatively admit the elements of a crime before claiming entrapment 
contradicts the Fifth Amendment’s right against self-incrimination.42 The court 
held that requiring affirmative admissions does not implicate the “unconstitu-
tional conditions” doctrine.43 The unconstitutional conditions doctrine provides 
“that government may not grant a benefit on the condition that the beneficiary 
surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that ben-
                                                                                                                           
 32 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206 (2017); Gray I, 357 P.3d at 834. 
 33 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001. 
 34 Id. at 1000, 1004. 
 35 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206; Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001–02. 
 36 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001. 
 37 Id. at 1001–02. 
 38 Id.; see State v. Nilsen, 657 P.2d 419, 420 (Ariz. 1983); State v. McKinney, 501 P.2d 378, 381 
(Ariz. 1972); supra note 8 and accompanying text. 
 39 Nilsen, 657 P.2d at 420; McKinney, 501 P.2d at 381. 
 40 Nilsen, 657 P.2d at 420. 
 41 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001–02, 1004. 
 42 Id. at 1003; see U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case 
to be a witness against himself . . . .”). 
 43 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1003. 
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efit altogether.”44 The majority reasoned that the affirmative admission re-
quirement is not an unconstitutional condition because entrapment is an af-
firmative defense, and because the requirement is similar to a plea bargain, 
where there is no constitutional bar.45 
Finally, the court rejected Gray’s argument that the entrapment statute, by 
providing that a defendant must admit by personal testimony or other evidence 
the substantial elements of the offense, allowed his recorded incriminating 
statements to be considered an admission of the crime.46 The court reasoned 
that the recordings did not prove that he affirmatively admitted the substantial 
elements of the offense, because an unintentional confession is not the same as 
a true admission of guilt.47 
II. THE HISTORY AND REASONING BEHIND THE DENIAL OF MAVERICK 
GRAY’S ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
The Arizona Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the Arizona Court of Ap-
peals, which had upheld the trial court’s finding that the Arizona entrapment 
statute required defendants to actively admit the substantial elements of the 
crime in order to assert the defense.48 The Arizona Supreme Court’s majority 
opinion, written by Chief Justice Scott Bales, interpreted the entrapment statute 
narrowly based on how the court previously ruled on the same issue in earlier 
cases that predated the enactment of the statute.49 The dissent, written by Justice 
Clint Bolick, argued that the majority’s definition of an affirmative admission 
raises concerns regarding defendants’ right against self-incrimination, and that 
Gray’s recorded statement clearly comports with the entrapment statute’s men-
tion of “other evidence” that could be considered an admission of a crime.50 
A. A Minority Approach 
The Arizona legislature enacted section 13-206, the entrapment statute, in 
1997.51 Prior to the statute’s enactment, Arizona’s entrapment defense was em-
bodied in common law.52 The majority in Gray referenced two cases demon-
strating the common law approach to the entrapment defense: State v. McKin-
                                                                                                                           
 44 Id. at 1006 (Bolick, J., dissenting) (quoting Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 
102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415 (1989)). 
 45 Id. at 1003 (majority opinion). 
 46 Id. at 1003–04. 
 47 Id. 
 48 State v. Gray (Gray II ) , 372 P.3d 999, 1004 (Ariz. 2016). 
 49 See id. at 1000–01. 
 50 See id. at 1004, 1009–10 (Bolick, J., dissenting). 
 51 Id. at 1002 (majority opinion); see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-206 (2017); supra note 24 and 
accompanying text. 
 52 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1001. 
38 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
ney and State v. Nilsen.53 In McKinney, decided in 1972, the Arizona Supreme 
Court held that for a defendant to invoke the entrapment defense, he or she 
must admit the substantial elements of the crime, and must not deny 
knowledge of the crime.54 The court elaborated on this point in 1983 in Nilsen, 
where it stated that the defendant’s admission must be made affirmatively, and 
not implicitly by silence.55 
In 1988, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Arizona’s common law ap-
proach in Mathews v. United States.56 Writing for the majority, Chief Justice 
William Rehnquist decided that, as a matter of federal law, a defendant may 
invoke the entrapment defense without admitting all of the elements of the 
crime.57 In Mathews, the prosecution argued that a defendant cannot both deny 
an element of a crime and raise an entrapment defense because this incon-
sistency would “encourage perjury, lead to jury confusion, and subvert the 
truth-finding function of the trial.”58 The court disagreed, however, noting that 
in most cases, any inconsistent testimony by the defendant would destroy his 
credibility, and thus his chances of prevailing at trial.59 
Despite Mathews, Arizona reaffirmed its common law approach in State 
v. Soule, reintroducing the concerns about perjury and jury confusion that the 
U.S. Supreme Court had dismissed in Mathews.60 Following the Arizona Su-
preme Court’s decision in Soule, the Arizona legislature enacted the entrap-
ment statute in 1997.61 Therefore, based on Arizona’s entrapment statute and 
its consistency with the cases that preceded it, the Arizona Supreme Court in 
Gray held that Gray did not meet the statute’s requirements for invoking the 
entrapment defense.62 
                                                                                                                           
 53 Id. at 1001–02 (citing State v. McKinney, 501 P.2d 378, 381 (Ariz. 1972); and then citing State 
v. Nilsen, 657 P.2d 419, 420 (Ariz. 1983)). 
 54 McKinney, 501 P.2d at 378, 381 (“A defendant who wishes to avail himself of a defense of 
entrapment must admit the substantial elements of the crime and one who denies knowledge of the 
crime may not raise the defense of entrapment.”) (citations omitted). 
 55 Nilsen, 657 P.2d at 419, 420 (“[W]e cannot see how one can passively admit to the elements of 
the offense. This admission must be made in some affirmative manner and cannot be assumed from a 
defendant’s silence.”). 
 56 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1002 (citing Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 62 (1988)). 
 57 Mathews, 485 U.S. at 58, 62; Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1002 (citing Mathews, 485 U.S. at 58, 62). 
 58 Mathews, 485 U.S. at 65. 
 59 Id. at 65–66. 
 60 Mathews, 485 U.S. at 65–66; Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1002 (citing State v. Soule, 811 P.2d 1071, 
1073–74 (Ariz. 1991)). Justice Bolick’s dissent in Gray highlighted Arizona’s outlier status in this 
matter by noting that the Mathews opinion influenced many states to abandon the inconsistent defense 
approach that required affirmative admission of the crime. See Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1004 (Bolick, J., 
dissenting). 
 61 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1002 (majority opinion). 
 62 Id. 
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B. Considering Maverick Gray’s Constitutional Rights 
In his appeal, Gray also contended that requiring a defendant to affirma-
tively admit the substantial elements of the crime conflicts with the U.S. Con-
stitution’s Fifth Amendment guarantee that “[N]o person . . . shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself . . . .”63 The court 
rejected Gray’s argument on the ground that the entrapment defense is an af-
firmative defense that attempts to excuse one’s criminal acts, and therefore 
necessitates an affirmative admission.64 The court also denied Gray’s argument 
that requiring an affirmative admission from the defendant effectively compels 
the defendant to confess.65 In so concluding, the court quoted Williams v. Flor-
ida, a 1970 U.S. Supreme Court case that held that presenting a defendant with 
the dilemma of choosing between silence and asserting a defense does not 
jeopardize his or her right against self-incrimination.66 
The dissent argued that limiting the entrapment defense to those who 
choose to admit the elements of the crime implicates the unconstitutional con-
ditions doctrine.67 The majority, however, found that the Arizona entrapment 
statute’s requirement of an affirmative admission is not an unconstitutional 
condition, relying on two U.S. Supreme Court cases.68 The first case, Corbitt v. 
New Jersey, decided in 1978, involved a plea bargain.69 The court in Corbitt 
held that no unconstitutional condition is placed on first-degree murder de-
fendants who have the option of pleading no contest in order to be eligible for 
a sentence of less than life imprisonment.70 The second case, Ohio Adult Pa-
role Authority v. Woodard, was decided in 1998 and involved a voluntary 
clemency interview.71 In Woodard, the Court held that a defendant’s Fifth 
Amendment privilege is not violated when the State adopts an unfavorable 
view toward defendants who decline to answer voluntary clemency interview 
questions.72 Based on these two cases, the court in Gray concluded that Arizo-
                                                                                                                           
 63 U.S. CONST. amend. V; Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1003. 
 64 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1003; see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-103(B) (2017) (“For the purposes 
of this section, ‘affirmative defense’ means a defense that is offered and that attempts to excuse the 
criminal actions of the accused or another person for whose actions the accused may be deemed to be 
accountable.”); § 13-206(A) (stating that entrapment is an affirmative defense). 
 65 See Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1003. 
 66 Id. at 1003 n.2 (quoting Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84) (“That the defendant faces . . . a 
dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense has never been 
thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimination.”). 
 67 Id. at 1006 (Bolick, J., dissenting). 
 68 Id. at 1003 (majority opinion) (citing Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 212, 218 (1978); and 
then citing Ohio Adult Parole Auth. v. Woodard, 523 U.S. 272, 285–88 (1998)). 
 69 Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 212, 221. 
 70 See id. at 218. 
 71 Woodard, 523 U.S. at 276. 
 72 Id. at 285–86. 
40 Boston College Journal of Law & Social Justice [Vol. 37:E. Supp. 
na can similarly limit the entrapment defense to defendants who admit the sub-
stantial elements of the crime.73 
In his dissent, Justice Bolick disagreed with the court’s conclusion that its 
interpretation of the entrapment statute did not place an unconstitutional condi-
tion on Gray.74 First, he noted that neither of the two cases the majority cited 
involved defendants being required to affirmatively admit elements of the 
crime.75 He suggested that Corbitt and Woodard involved situations with sig-
nificantly less pressure on the defendants, which only further emphasized the 
unjustly mandatory nature of Arizona’s affirmative admission requirement.76 
Justice Bolick also cited a 1968 U.S. Supreme Court case, United States v. 
Jackson, in which Justice Potter Stewart, in his opinion for the court, invalidat-
ed part of a federal statute that subjected defendants in certain kidnapping cas-
es to the death penalty unless they pled guilty or waived their right to a jury 
trial.77 The Court in Jackson held that the statute “needlessly chill[ed]” de-
fendants from asserting their constitutional right to refuse to plead guilty and 
demand a jury trial, and thus was unconstitutional.78 
Relying on Jackson, Justice Bolick argued that Arizona’s entrapment stat-
ute similarly discourages defendants from asserting their right against self-
incrimination.79 He objected to the State’s contention that allowing Gray to 
assert the entrapment defense would foster perjury and jury confusion, because 
it is possible for innocence and entrapment to coexist, especially when it 
comes to crimes requiring specific intent.80 Justice Bolick also referred back to 
Mathews, where the U.S. Supreme Court held that inconsistent defenses would 
“impair a defendant’s credibility, thus providing a check against raising 
them.”81 Therefore, in Justice Bolick’s view, potential inconsistency and jury 
confusion are “feeble” justifications for stripping defendants of such a core 
constitutional liberty.82 
                                                                                                                           
 73 Woodard, 523 U.S. at 286–87; Corbitt, 439 U.S. at 225–26; Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1003. 
 74 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1006 (Bolick, J., dissenting). 
 75 Id. at 1009 n.3. 
 76 See id. 
 77 United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570, 570, 582–85 (1968); Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1007 (citing 
Jackson, 390 U.S. at 584–85). 
 78 Jackson, 390 U.S. at 582–83. 
 79 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1007. 
 80 Id. at 1006 (explaining that for specific intent crimes, where one can admit engaging in certain 
actions while denying the intent to commit the crime, there is no inconsistency between admitting to 
the crime and asserting the entrapment defense). 
 81 Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1008 (citing Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 64–65 (1988)). 
 82 Id. at 1007. 
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C. “Other Evidence” 
The Arizona Supreme Court also held that Gray’s incriminating state-
ments, captured by a recording by the undercover police officer, were insuffi-
cient to satisfy section 13-206.83 The court explained that because Gray did not 
affirmatively admit each substantial element of the offense in these statements, 
he did not adequately admit to the commission of the crime of sale of narcot-
ics.84 The court described Gray’s statements in the recording as an ignorant 
inculpation of himself, and distinguished it from an admission.85 Finally, the 
court noted that the recorded conversation on its own was insufficient to prove 
that the transaction took place.86 
Justice Bolick took the opposite view in his dissent, arguing that the re-
cordings were essentially an admission of the crime.87 He first emphasized that 
the entrapment statute, by stating that “other evidence” could be an admission 
of the crime, clearly included Gray’s recorded statements.88 Justice Bolick 
stressed that the majority neglected to sufficiently explain why a pre-Miranda 
admission like Gray’s did not constitute “other evidence.”89 Justice Bolick also 
explained that Gray did in fact admit the substantial elements of the crime, be-
cause by saying “I’m a good person” and “I don’t usually do this” immediately 
after the drug transaction, Gray admitted to the substantial elements of the 
crime of selling narcotics, namely knowingly selling or transferring a narcotic 
drug.90 
III. PROTECTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF DEFENDANTS RAISING 
THE ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE 
Justice Bolick’s dissent in Gray accurately depicts the threat to constitu-
tional liberty that the Arizona entrapment statute poses to criminal defend-
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ants.91 In Arizona, if defendants want to argue that law enforcement induced 
them to commit a crime, they must first admit all the substantial elements of 
the crime, even if a denial of an element would not result in an inconsistency.92 
As Justice Bolick noted, there are certain crimes for which defendants could 
deny one of the elements of the crime and still logically raise an entrapment 
defense.93 One example of this is a specific intent crime, where a defendant 
could deny having the intent to commit the crime, while admitting to the acts 
of committing the crime.94 Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Mathews 
added strong support to this argument, explaining that if a jury finds induce-
ment and lack of predisposition, which are the two main factors of an entrap-
ment defense, then commission of the crime is automatically proven, eliminat-
ing the need for an affirmative admission of the crime.95 
By precluding defendants from raising the entrapment defense unless they 
give up their constitutional right to self-incrimination, Arizona’s approach to 
entrapment may have a disproportionate effect on certain groups of individu-
als.96 Research suggests that an overwhelming number of victims of govern-
ment entrapment schemes are minorities, namely black and Hispanic individu-
als.97 Based on those statistics, Arizona’s entrapment statute may have a dis-
proportionate impact on those individuals, and may lead to higher percentages 
of drug convictions and prison sentencing in those communities.98 Such results 
                                                                                                                           
 91 See State v. Gray (Gray II ) , 372 P.3d 999, 1006 (Ariz. 2016) (Bolick, J., dissenting). 
 92 See id. at 1004. 
 93 Id. at 1006. 
 94 Id. 
 95 See Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 67 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 96 See Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1004; Brad Heath, Investigation: ATF Drug Stings Targeted Minori-
ties, USA TODAY (July 20, 2014, 10:19 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/
07/20/atf-stash-house-stings-racial profiling/12800195/ [https://perma.cc/F6CK-JXCD] (illustrating 
data and statistics on the disparate impact that government sting operations have on minorities, partic-
ularly black and Hispanic individuals); Annie Sweeney and Jason Meisner, Chicago Prosecutors 
Quietly Drop Charges Tied to Drug Stash House Stings, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 29, 2015, 8:12 PM), http://
www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-stash-houses-charges-dropped-met-20150129-story.
html [https://perma.cc/J9BZ-FXQ8] (reporting that government agencies have been criticized for 
leading sting operations targeting mostly minority suspects). 
 97 See Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1004; Heath, supra note 96; Sweeney & Meisner, supra note 96. 
 98 See Gray II, 372 P.3d at 1004; Jim Yardley, The Heat Is on a Texas Town After the Arrest of 40 
Blacks, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 7, 2000), http://www.nytimes.com/2000/10/07/us/the-heat-is-on-a-texas-
town-after-the-arrests-of-40-blacks.html [https://perma.cc/5ETR-CQEM]. During a government sting 
operation in Tulia, Texas, forty of forty-three defendants arrested were black, although blacks consti-
tuted only ten percent of Tulia’s population. Yardley, supra. The American Civil Liberties Union filed 
a lawsuit against the agencies responsible for the sting, alleging racial bias as motivation for the op-
eration, which led to twenty-two defendants being imprisoned and the rest placed on probation. Adam 
Liptak, $5 Million Settlement Ends Case of Tainted Texas Sting, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 11, 2004), http://
www.nytimes.com/2004/03/11/us/5-million-settlement-ends-case-of-tainted-texas-sting.html [https://
perma.cc/55B5-EPJE]; Yardley, supra. The Tulia case was later settled, with government officials 
acknowledging poor supervision of the undercover agent who executed the operation. Liptak, supra. 
The agent was later convicted of perjury. Steve Barnes, Rogue Narcotics Agent in Texas Is Found 
2017] State v. Gray and Arizona’s Outlier Entrapment Statute 43 
are contrary to the purposes of the Fifth Amendment’s Self-Incrimination 
Clause, which was designed to protect the rights of all criminal defendants to 
be presumed innocent and remain silent, and to ensure that the government 
proves the elements of their crimes beyond a reasonable doubt.99 
Justice Bolick also correctly identified the problems surrounding Arizo-
na’s entrapment statute and the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
statute.100 First, he stressed that the court based its decision solely on the fact 
that the statute is consistent with Arizona common law.101 He properly indicat-
ed that the reasoning from those common law cases had already been ad-
dressed and refuted by the U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews.102 Additionally, 
the majority of states have updated their entrapment statutes to eliminate or 
modify the affirmative admission requirement.103 Yet, the court in Gray did not 
provide any additional meritorious reason for upholding its minority ap-
proach.104 The U.S. Supreme Court in Mathews directly addressed the potential 
problems of perjury and jury confusion in its decision to strike the affirmative 
admissions requirement for defendants asserting the entrapment defense.105 
Furthermore, Justice Bolick emphasized that the protection of defendants’ fun-
damental rights in the criminal context substantially outweigh the dangers of 
perjury and jury confusion, which are mitigated nevertheless through the de-
fendant’s in-court testimony.106 
CONCLUSION 
The Arizona Supreme Court inappropriately held in Gray that to assert 
the defense of entrapment, criminal defendants must affirmatively admit the 
substantial elements of their crimes. According to the court, merely declining 
to challenge the State’s evidence or offering pre-Miranda incriminating state-
ments as evidence of the admission does not satisfy that requirement. By ad-
hering to this strict common law approach to entrapment, Arizona veers from 
the modern trajectory of the U.S. Supreme Court and the majority of other 
states, where the need for affirmative admissions in entrapment statutes has 
already been addressed and rejected. 
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More importantly, the Arizona Supreme Court’s decision also endangers 
defendants’ Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. It requires 
them to admit all the substantial elements of their crimes in order to raise the 
entrapment defense, even if denying an element would not be inconsistent with 
the defense. Given the core liberty at stake and the lack of a strong argument 
for affirmative admissions, the court should consider an alternative approach to 
the entrapment defense that gives defendants greater leeway to assert the de-
fense by silence or other evidence, and to allow the jury to decide whether de-
fendants merit the defense. By doing so, the court also upholds fairness for 
minorities, black and Hispanic individuals in particular, who potentially expe-
rience a disparate impact from government entrapment operations and will 
likely be disproportionately affected by the majority’s decision in Gray. 
